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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DANIEL ALLEN TEMPLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 14232
-v-

:

SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden,
Utah State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant through a writ of habeas corpus
challenged the validity of parole date rescission
procedures employed when his unexecuted parole
date was rescinded.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The petition for writ of habeas corpus
was heard and argued before the Honorable Marcellus
K. Snow, Third Judicial District Court.

Judge

Snow issued an order denying the writ and raade and
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment
rendered by the lower court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant is presently confined at the Utah
State Prison.

He was committed to the prison on

December 1, 1969, pursuant to his conviction on two
counts of grand larceny.
On September 27, 1972, the Board of Pardons
granted appellant a prospective parole release date
of March 12, 19 74.

This date was conditional upon

appellant's appropriate conduct during the interim
period• (Tr. pp. 29-30).
On March 12, 1973, appellant was allowed
to enter a drug rehabilitation program at Odyssey
House.

He disappeared from Odyssey House August

27, 19 73.

He was arrested November 7, 19 73, in

El Paso, Texas for car theft.

(letter from appellant

to the Board of Pardons dated February 25, 1975).
Appellant was examined by a psychiatrist, and
admitted to the Texas State Mental Hospital under
the name of Ed Temple.

Appellant was discharged

from the Texas State Hospital on April 27, 19 74,
(more than a month after his previously granted
parole date).

Utah prison and parole officials

were unaware of appellant's status or location because he was using the name Ed Temple.

Appellant was
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again arrested on June 11, 1974, and charged with
escape from the Utah State Prison, suspicion of
burglary, and burglary.

Utah Correctional authori-

ties became aware of appellant's status as a result
of the June 11, 19 74, arrest and he was returned
to the Utah State Prison on January 30, 19 75.

The

charges in Texas for escape and burglary were dismissed against appellant when he was returned.
Appellant appeared before the Board of
Pardons on February 26, 1975, and his previously
granted parole date was rescinded.

In a letter

prepared for the parole board dated February 25,
19 75, appellant admitted his escape from Odyssey
House and outlined his activities during the period
of escape.

Appellant did not request to present

any witnesses or documentary evidence during his
hearing, although such a request would have been
honored by the parole board (Tr. p. 34, 11.6-13).
Appellant petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus in July of 1975.

The writ was denied by

Judge Snow and appellant now appeals from that
decision.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RESCISSION OF AN UNEXECUTED PAROLE DATE
IS NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF A PAROLE REVOCATION AND
THE PROCEDURES EMPLOYED IN RESCINDING APPELLANT'S
PAROLE DATE WERE THEREFORE VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL,
Appellant contends that the procedural
protections necessary in a parole or probation hearing, as elaborated in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(19 73), should be extended to a parole date
rescission hearing.

There is no controlling case

requiring the extension of Morrissey,, supra,
and Gagnon, supra,

beyond their particular facts,

and we "therefore reject that contention.
Morrissey was a case involving the revocation of parole.
of probation.

Gagnon dealt with the revocation

In both situations, (parole and pro-

bation) one convicted of a crime is granted considerable freedom outside of the prison facility.
The revocation of that freedom is a drastic change
in status for the parolee or probationer.

Such a

change may reasonably be considered a "grievous
loss."
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The instant case is far different from
Morrissey and Gagnon.
Here, appellant had been granted a conditional parole date.
that date.

He had no vested right in

He merely had a conditional promise

that he could enjoy freedom outside the prison i^f
he conducted himself in accord with the terms of
the parole agreement.
When the Board of Pardons rescinded appellant' s parole date he was a duly incarcerated
prisoner.

His status was not altered by the '

rescission.

His limited rights and freedom inside

the prison were not diminished nor were any extra
rights or freedom revoked.
Appellant argues that because his parole
date was rescinded after its effective date such
rescission is, in effect, a parole revocation.
(Appellant's Brief, page 6).

Such a conclusion

is not warranted by the facts. Appellant was
simply not a parolee.
on parole.

He had never been placed

The exact terms of his parole had

not been defined.

He had no parole officer.

He did not have a legally sanctioned right to
freedom outside the prison.
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The court in Scarpa v. United States Board
of Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1973) (dismissing
a federal prisoner's complaint regarding parole
board hearing procedures

denying him a parole

date) explained the difference between a potential
parolee and one who enjoys the expanded rights of
actual parole or probation:
"Whether the Board grants
parole is a clearly distinguishable exercise of discretion from
revoking one's conditional
freedom. . .Scarpa . . .attempts
to equate the possibility of
conditional freedom with the
right to conditional freedom.
We find such logic unacceptable."
(p. 282)
Even after the effective date of his parole
release date appellant only had a possibility of
conditional freedom.

That freedom did not become

operative merely because the predetermined release
date passed.
It is true that appellant's parole release
date was rescinded after its effective date but
an analysis of the facts of the present case indicates that the actions of the Board of Pardons
did not deny appellant due process of law.
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Appellant disappeared from Odyssey House
several months before the effective date of his
parole.

Appellant suggests (Appellant's Brief, p.

8) that his release date could have been rescinded
promptly after his disappearance.

By the terms

of appellant's parole agreement an immediate
rescission would have been justified (Tr. pp. 29-30)•
However, such a summary procedure would have been
somewhat unfair because the prisoner himself would
have been absent from the proceeding.

In light

of that unfairness the Board of Pardons waited
until appellant had returned to prison before
a rescission hearing was held.

Appellant admitted

his escape in a letter to the Board before the
hearing and did not request to offer any evidence
at the hearing.

The terms of appellant's parole

agreement became null and void as a result of his
admission and yet the Board still allowed him the
opportunity of a hearing.
The net effect of appellant's written
admission of escape coupled with the self-executing
terms of his prospective parole release agreement
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was to obviate the need for a formal "finding" by
the Board concerning his escape.
In light of the above facts it is submitted
that the action by the Board of Pardons was a parole
date rescission hearing not a parole revocation
hearing and coraported with due process requirements
for parole rescission proceedings.
POINT II
THE PROCEDURES USED IN RESCINDING APPELLANT ' S PAROLE DATE WERE CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORE
RIGOROUS DUE PROCESS STANDARDS THAN THOSE
AFFORDED APPELLANT ARE NOT REQUIRED.
No cases controlling in Utah have extended
the due process requirements of Morrissey, supra_,
and Gagnon, supra, to parole date rescission hearings.
While some of the cases cited by appellant
appear at first reading to suggest the extension
°f Morrissey and Gagnon standards to parole
rescission hearings, a close reading of the cases
reveals important differences between them and
the present case.
Appellant cites Batchelder v. Kenten,
383 F.Supp. 299 ( C D . Calif. 1974), as the case
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most similar in fact and principle to the instant
case.

In Batchelder, however, the petitioner

suffered a parole date rescission but also was
transferred to a more secure institution.

The

rescission plus the change in status was held by
that particular court to be a significant 'grievous
loss1' which broughtMorrissey into play.

No

change of status occurred in the present case.
In fact, appellant was given a new parole date
despite his fifteen month absence.
In re Prewitt, 105 Cal.Rptr. 318, 503
P.2d 1326 (1972), is cited for the extension of
Morrissey, but there petitioner not only lost a
potential release date but was denied future
possibility of parole.

This denial of future parole

was based on information submitted by lav; enforcement agencies which had investigated petitioner's
case.

The loss suffered by Prewitt (rescission

of parole and denial of possibility of future
parole) was greater than in the present case and
the actions of the California Adult Authority were
very similar to a sentencing proceeding where
considerable due process protections are afforded.
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In

Means v. Wainwright, 299 So.2d 577

(Fla. 1974, U.S. cert, den., 419 U.S. 1116), the
Florida Court ordered Morrissey standards for
parole rescission hearings after a petitionees
parole release date was summarily rescinded
without a hearing.

The Court in Means seemed

to be imposing Morrissey requirements to fill the
procedural gap which existed because the Florida
correctional authority had failed to provide
even minimum due process protections.

In contrast,

the Utah Board of Pardons provides considerable
due process safeguards in its parole grant and
parole rescission hearings, obviating the need for
judicial imposition of due process limits in the
present case.
Appellant maintains that even if MorrisseyGagnon standards don't apply in the present case
a lesser but considerable degree of due process
is "mandated" in Utah but was not afforded to
appellant.
Respondent submits that the above conclusion is erroneous.

The cases cited by appellant

which impose limited but substantial due process
on parole rescission hearings are not controlling
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in Utah and are distinguishable from the present
case*
In Lepre v. Butler, 394 F. Supp. 185
(E.D. Pa. 1975) a prisoner's parole release date
was rescinded without notice or hearing after
the release date had expired but while the prisoner
was still incarcerated.

The court here like the court

in Means v. Wainwright, supra, seeirs to be filling
a procedural gap created by the state correctional
system's failure to grant a hearing.
The instant case is far different.

Appellant

was not in custody when his parole date came due;
he was an escapee.

The Board of Pardons waited

for his return and then conducted a hearing, of
which appellant had notice.
In

Karger v. Sigler, 384 F. Supp. 10

(D.Mass. 1974) the United States Board of Parole
contravened its own rules by rescinding petitioner's
parole date solely on the basis of a previous hearing.
The court in Karger only mandated notice and hearing for a rescission proceeding and expressly
rejected the necessity of counsel, the right to
present witnesses and documentary evidence, and
the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses.
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There are important differences between Karger
and the present case.
prisoner*

Appellant is not a federal

The Board of Pardons waived the oppor-

tunity to rescind appellant1s date while he was
an escapee, which was possible under the terms of
the parole grant agreement.

Appellant did have

a hearing, with notice corce^ning the rescission
of his parole date.
Godfrey v. Preiser, 80 Misc. 2d 361, 363 N.Y.S.
2d 463 (1975), is distinguished, like Batchelder,
supra, because the grievous loss suffered by
Godfrey was confinement at a more secuie institution
(Attica) plus the rescission of his parole date.
No transfer occurred in the instant case*
Jackson v. Wise, 390 F.Supp. 17 (CD.
Calif. 1975), involved a federal prisoner whose
parole release date was rescinded solely on the
incident reports from the prison without an
independent investigation.
In the case now before the court, appellant's
parole date was rescinded largely on the basis of
his own admission of misconduct in a letter to the
parole board.

Moreover, the hearing afforded

appellant the opportunity to present additional
or mitigating evidence.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It should be noted that both Lepre, supra,
an(

3 Jackson, supra, may be moot and therefore value-

less for precedential purposes.
Appellant suggests that the due process
standards suggested by some courts for the granting
of a parole release date or the standards of Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), concerning
prison disciplinary proceedings should apply to
parole rescission hearings.
These views are unsupported by controlling
case lav/ and respondent submits that the approach
of the court in Sexton v. Wise, 494 F.2d 1176
(5th Cir. 1974) , which deals with the summary
rescission of parole dates, which is the situation
in the present case, is sensible and instructive.
The court in Sexton unequivocally states
that:
"Until a parole is finalized,
no constitutional protections associated with a parole revocation embrace
the intended parole.11 (p. 1178)
(Emphasis added.)
The Sexton court approved the rescission
of a parole release grant to a federal prisoner which
occurred without a hearing or notice, reasoning:
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"That until final release
occurs, the Board does not
relinquish its broad discretionary powers to rescind any
future parole."
There is no case requiring the imposition
of

Morrissey, Wolff or parole grant due process

standards on a parole rescission hearing.

Appel-

lant was given a hearing within a meaningful time
after his return to custody.

He had an opportunity

to explain his escape or present evidence and
witnesses (time being provided for their acquisition) . The decision and action of the Board of
Pardons were fair and complied with the due process clause of the United States Consitution.
POINT III
APPELLANTfS PAROLE RELEASE DATE COULD BE
RESCINDED SUBSEQUENT TO ITS EFFECTIVE DATE.
Appellant's parole release date was officially rescinded within a month after he returned
to custody following a period of escape of
approximately eighteen months.

As has been

mentioned the terms of appellantfs prospective
parole date grant agreement were self-executing
and became null and void without a "rescission"
whenever appellant violated a rule or refused to
perform an assigned duty of the prison (Tr. pp.
29-30).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Despite the self-executing, permissive
language of the parole grant agreement the Board
of Pardons waited until appellant could physically
attend a rescission hearing before any action
rescinding his unexecuted parole date was taken.
The logical extension of appellants
argument that the Board had no authority to
rescind an unexecuted parole date once it passed
suggests interesting consequences.

All prisoners

with future parole dates could escape before their
parole dates became effective and if the prisoner
were not recaptured before the effective date of
the parole grant agreements they could demand parole
revocation hearings (as opposed to parole date rescission hearings) because of their illegal absence.
The alternative suggested by appellant,
rescission without the presence of the prisoner,
would not be as fair as the procedures used by the
Board.

The Board of Pardons did what was reasonable

and fair in the present situation.

It allowed

appellant to attend the rescission hearing and
explain his actions.

It then rescinded an already

void, unexecuted parole date and granted appellant
a future date.

To require more of the Board under

the circumstances is contrary to common sense.
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POINT IV
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW ENTERED BY THE TRIAL COURT ARE SUPPORTED BY
THE RECORD AND ESPECIALLY WHEN VIEWED LIBERALLY
IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT DO NOT CONSTITUTE
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Appellant submits five points which appeared
in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
as error demanding reversal in the instant case.
We reject appellant's contention as being
conclusionary and unsupported by any precedent.
The claimed erroneous Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law are:
" (1) The rescission of the parole date
was based upon the ground that appellant had been an escapee at the time
of the effective date of his parole
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 6 ) ;
(2) The rescission of appellant's parole
release date by the Board of Pardons
was proper and in accordance with law
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 13);
(3) The rescission was proper and
in accordance with law and did not
deprive appellant of his constitutional right to due process of
law in that Morrissey and Gagnon,
supra, are inapplicable to rescission of parole release date hearings and appellant self-induced the
delay of the rescission hearing by
being on escapee status when his
parole date came due (Conclusions
of Law, paragraph 3);
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(4) There have been no errors or
infringements of appellant's
constitutional rights because
appellant pleaded guilty at
the parole rescission hearing
(Conclusions of Law, paragraph
4);
(5) Appellant's incarceration is
legal (Conclusions of lav; paragraph 5) ."
As to the first point.

Respondent submitted

into evidence a letter from appellant to the Board
of Pardons in which he admitted escaping from
Odyssey House (T.10, attached letter), and chronicled
his activities until his return to the Utah State
Prison.

There is no requirement (statutory or

otherwise) that a prisoner be given the reasons
for a parole date rescission.
As to the second, third and fifth points
going to the legality of the rescission all of
appellant's citations of error are based on unwarranted and conclusory assumptions about the parole
rescission procedure in Utah.
It appears from the record that 1) appellant wrote to the Board of Pardons concerning his
escape a day before his rescission hearing (Tr. p. 10).
2)

Appellant did not present witnesses or evidence.
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He could have, but did not request to do so
(Tr. p. 30-31).

It is not established in Utah nor

suggested by the United States Supreme Court that
assistance of counsel or confrontation of witnesses
is required in parole rescission hearings.

Nor are

findings by the Board required to be furnished
to the prisoner, nor is a preliminary hearing on the
question of probable cause mandated in Utah or in
federal courts for parole date rescission hearings.
The trial courtfs findings on all of the
above matters was in complete accord with the lav/
in Utah.
As to the remainder of the third point.
Appellant has failed to present a single case
which requires the extension of Morrissey and
Gagnon due process standards to parole rescission
hearings.
As to the fourth point, appellant admitted
his escape in a letter to the Board of Pardons
(Tr. p.10).

It should be noted that the Board of

Pardons is not a judicial tribunal.
cretionary, administrative body.

It is a dis-

Proceedings

before it do not require judicial standards of due
process or submission of evidence.

It is entirely

within the discretion of the Board to consider
evidence
given to it by prisoners and prison officials.
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The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Lav; entered by the trial court were in accord
v/itb the law in Utah concerning parole rescission
procedures.
CONCLUSION
The procedures employed in rescinding
appellant's unexecuted parole date were fair and
constitutional.

There are no cases which require

the extension of Morrissey, Gagnon, or Wolff due
process safeguards to parole date rescission
hearings.

The Findings and Conclusions of the

trial court are consistent with the record and
reveal no reversible deficiencies.
If this Court should find some reversible
error, however, respondent submits that the appropriate remedy would be to allow the Board of Pardons
to give appellant a rescission hearing in compliance
with standards enunciated by this court.

This

provision for a new hearing as the appropriate
remedy was allowed in Karger, supra.
In light of the facts of this case and
the arguments presented above, respondent submits
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that the decision of the court below was correct
and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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